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Abstract:
Limited resources are the permanent condition in health care. Rationing, according to
H. Kliemt, is the distribution of limited resources below market prices to all people in
need for these resources. Therefore, rationing is a basic component of every kind of hu-
man health care system. However, the crucial problem is how to ﬁnd just and fair rules
for this distribution under the premise, that every patient should have the same chance.
The allocation of organs for transplant can serve as a paradigmatic example for study-
ing rationing problems, as shortage of organs cannot be denied nor abolished. H. Kliemt
compared the situation with the classic decathlon. The selection of factors and the combi-
nation and weighing of these factors for ‘winning a donor organ’ should strictly be related
to individuals. Non-medical criteria should generally be accepted and authorized as far
as they are relevant to the question of justice and fairness. In this paper the so-called
‘solidarity model’, an example of joint research with Hartmut Kliemt, is introduced as an
allocation system with the power to enhance justice and fairness.
Munich 1994, Congress of the German Society of Surgery—the head of my sur-
gical department, Prof. R. Pichlmayr asked me to join a special conference: A
book was to be presented by a philosopher on organ allocation.
Curiously, I agreed at once and a few minutes later, I listened to Hartmut
Kliemt presenting his idea on a club model: “Donor Organs for Members only”.
The auditory did not agree. The reactions ranged from a lack of understanding
to indignation posing a lot of arguments against such ideas. In short, the “unreal
theoretical thoughts of an unworldly philosopher” were generally refused.
I remember being surprised. However, I realized that the idea was based on
the fact of the actual and undeniable scarcity of organs, and the club model pre-
sented was an attempt to propose a solution ensuring a fair distribution of too
few organs. Thus, my spontaneous comment was that although nobody liked the
philosopher’s idea, Hartmut Kliemt was closer to reality than we all liked to ad-
mit. This was the beginning of a lasting and fruitful cooperation with Hartmut
Kliemt and, last but not least, of an equally good and lasting friendship.
Moreover it was also the beginning of difﬁcult discussions within the pro-
fessional society of organ transplantation which have put Hartmut Kliemt and412 Gundolf Gubernatis
myself at odds with the mainstream position of large parts of this society—a
position in which we still remain.
Later, in July 94, the Ärztliche Praxis published Hartmut Kliemt’s proposal
together with three comments: F. W. Eigler’s point of view was totally against
the model (“Organspende nur auf Gegenseitigkeit nicht in die Praxis umzuset-
zen”) based on ethical principles of the medical profession. R. Pichlmayr was
also against the model (“Als Arzt kann ich doch keinem die Behandlung ver-
weigern”), however, was more moderate respecting the idea of mutual help as
a basis for organ donation. My statement (“Ein Transplantat ist keine Pille,
die man sich bei Bedarf rezeptieren lässt”) was in favour of starting the discus-
sion about solidarity as a relevant factor for justice in organ allocation and of
developing such models on the basis of the idea of the club model.
To my surprise Hartmut Kliemt continued working in the ﬁeld of organ al-
location. I considered this subject too specialized or respectively too unimpor-
tant for general studies, however, I learned from Hartmut Kliemt, that organ
allocation can serve as a perfect paradigmatic example for studying rationing
problems. In contrast to a ﬁnancial shortage which can arguably be solved if
the society is willing and strong enough, the shortage of organs can neither be
denied nor solved and should be evident to all. Thus, organ allocation is the
best example to develop and test basic principles and models for the general
question, how to cope with scarcity in the medical ﬁeld and how to distribute
goods in health care—and how to give the same option to everybody in need.
The crucial question in organ allocation is of patients’ utmost interests—it is
the question ‘who should live and who should die’.
First of all, Hartmut Kliemt identiﬁed a clear and well deﬁned difference
between scarcity as such and rationing. Rationing in a general sense is tra-
ditionally associated with queuing, waiting and hoping that at the end of the
queue someone will receive something that cannot be obtained by other means,
respectively which can only be received through paying a higher price. Rationing
therefore has nothing to do with taking away, on the contrary, rationing is associ-
ated with receiving something. The deﬁnition of rationing according to Hartmut
Kliemt is the distribution of limited resources below market prices to all people
in need of these resources. Therefore, rationing is a basic component of every
kind of human health care system. However, the crucial problem is the ques-
tion of rules for this distribution and therefore the question of justice under the
premise that every patient should have the same chance of receiving the same
or an individually necessary part of the limited resource.
In the case of organ transplants this difference between scarcity and ra-
tioning and the role of physicians is quite obvious and impressive, however, not
particularly well realized by most physicians. The essential role of the physi-
cian is to diagnose the patient’s need for a transplant. After this diagnosis, the
patient is put on a waiting list for a transplant instead of immediately receiving
such a transplant as a result of an organ shortage. This ﬁrst step of becoming a
candidate for a transplant is absolutely uncritical and does not affect the rela-
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allocate an organ to one individual patient on the waiting list is a typical act of
rationing and is highly critical for the trust relationship because giving an organ
to one patient inevitably ignores the demand for an organ of other patients.
Due to medical problems in the pioneer phase of organ transplantation there
was no other way but to give decision—making powers in organ allocation to
physicians or surgeons respectively. Nowadays as the transplanting of organs
has largely become a routine procedure with standardized allocation factors, the
question arises why only physicians should decide on selection and weigh factors
of organ allocation criteria. In other words, it is quite unclear why physicians af-
ﬂict the physician-patient trust-relationship in such a critical and unnecessary
manner and physicians turn themselves into “rationing agents of the society”
(term by Hartmut Kliemt). Without any doubt, medical professionals have to be
involved in selection of criteria, and the weighing of factors etc. in a more gen-
eral sense on the so-called macro level of allocation. In the micro allocation level
which afﬂicts individual patients’ interest directly, rationing decisions should
only be taken by a third party using generally accepted rules. On this level the
difference between need, scarcity and rationing becomes obvious: The physi-
cians decide on the need by putting the patient on the waiting list, but they
should not decide on rationing by allocating one organ to one special patient
(see above) rather than another. It is a common misunderstanding that deci-
sion making on the individual micro allocation level is understood as a typical
physician’s task and that decisions on the macro allocation level should be done
by people other than physicians. Under conditions of scarcity and rationing, it
has to be done vice versa concerning the micro allocation level! In this context
the current system run by Eurotransplant can be universally accepted. The cru-
cial question, however, arises in context of the macro allocation level: why is
the selection of criteria and the weighing of factors a decision by medical profes-
sionals or an exclusive decision by the medical association? The second crucial
question is why only medical criteria are accepted and—by advice of the medical
society—authorized by legislation (German Transplantation Law §12(3)).
Apart from the traditional role of physicians in the organ allocation process
which includes establishing rules for allocation in the pioneer phase and apart
from the fact that physicians may like being in this powerful position of making
life or death decisions in relation to organ transplants, one reason may be that
medical criteria are generally considered as being just and fair. Medical crite-
ria can objectively be decided upon only by physicians. Thus, especially in the
political sphere, medical criteria are well accepted and the decision-making is
consequently in the hands of physicians and their professional associations only,
with the consequence that all other people including politicians can leave this
difﬁcult task to the physicians. The second critical question, however, is whether
or not medical criteria are the only important ones and whether non-medical cri-
teria are unjust and unfair a priori. Of course, there is a general consent that
the ﬁnancial power of a patient should play no role in receiving any kind of treat-
ment in social health care systems. The same is true of discriminating factors
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On the other hand, non-medical criteria exist which are relevant to decisions
on organ transplants. In fact, some of these criteria have been applied since the
beginning of the practice of transplants, e.g. the primary distribution of organs
within a country or the old rule that one of two kidneys of the donor remain in
the donor region for a patient of the local center carrying out transplants (this
rule is no longer applied in Germany). These rules are based on principles of
reciprocity without any medical basis. And these rules were well accepted. An-
other example is the factor of waiting time, generally considered a fair criterion.
The medical component of waiting time, however, is urgency. The remainder is
a non-medical time factor.
An example is as follows: two patients with identical medical criteria in-
cluding urgency for receiving one given donor organ are waiting for a long time:
the ﬁrst patient for 8 years and 7 days and the second patient for 8 years and
8 days. Under the current allocation system the second patient would receive
the organ as a result of having waited one day longer which in this case is a
purely non-medical factor. The question of justice arises acutely in this case if
you know that the ﬁrst patient is a potential willing donor or has already served
as a living donor and the second patient has declared that he is against organ
donation and will on his own death refuse to donate his healthy organs. (It is a
fact, that patients on waiting lists are generally not asked whether or not they
are potential donors. Moreover, some of these patients are not willing to donate
their own healthy organs in case of brain death.) This example illustrates that
non-medical criteria are equally involved in classic allocation and that other
non-medical criteria are closely related to the issue of organ transplants. This is
especially true in relation to the question of individual willingness to donate or-
gans. The question why non-medical criteria especially donation willingness are
not accepted as factor for organ allocation cannot be easily answered. Maybe in
the political sphere, people try to avoid potentially controversial public discus-
sions and consider that it is more acceptable to leave decisions to physicians who
evaluate medical criteria only. However, the ignorance of non-medical criteria
will not improve justice and fairness in the organ allocation system.
In consequence, which criteria should be used and how should these criteria
be evaluated?
My basic principle and proposal are as follows:
Non-medical criteria should generally be accepted and authorized.
A precondition for the acceptance of a criterion—medical or non-
medical—is that the criterion has to be relevant to the question of
organ transplants.
Justiﬁcation: There is no doubt that medical criteria exist with-
out any relevance to the outcome in the ﬁeld of organ transplants.
Equally, there is no doubt that non-medical criteria exist with high
relevance to the transplanting of organs such as willingness to do-
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Hartmut Kliemt’s basic principle and proposal are as follows:
The selection of factors and the combination and weighting of these
factors is only acceptable if they are strictly related to individuals.
Any kind of collective factor must be avoided.
Justiﬁcation: The case of organ allocation and selecting and weight-
ing of factors in order to determine the ‘winner of the match’ for one
given organ is a very old problem, and has an ancient precursor: The
decathlon. In this discipline it would be absolutely unacceptable to
give collective points for being member of a certain group. E.g. it
would not be acceptable if all American runners get a 10% credit on
their running time and all African runners get one second added to
each runner’s time result. In contrast, in formula 1 race points are
given for belonging to a certain racing stable. In a complete differ-
ent ﬁeld of society, it is well accepted giving priority to EU citizens
for receiving jobs in Europe. It is surprising that collective points
such as nationality are accepted in the organ allocation system: be-
ing an Austrian patient respectively living in Austria and waiting
on the Austrian waiting list is much more promising for receiving an
organ by Eurotransplant than being a German patient on a German
waiting list.
Hartmut Kliemt has done a lot of research especially in this ﬁeld. Many publica-
tions indicate the tremendous work done by him, either alone, or together with
others, inter alia, in larger research groups. I was involved in some of these
projects.
As an example of our mutual research, I would like to present our so-called
‘solidarity model’ which was developed on the basis of reciprocity-ideas begin-
ning with the club model, and resulted in a well designed additional allocation
system with deﬁned principles, the potential of practical application and positive
legal and social implications.
The Solidarity Model
Deﬁnition and Essential Characteristics
A system of organ donation and organ allocation is a solidarity system or a sys-
tem based on solidarity if it gives relative priority to those potential recipients
of organs who themselves are declared potential donors of organs.
Those who declare their willingness to donate, in particular before develop-
ing their disease and being put on a waiting list, are given higher priority as
organ recipients. In the case of a kidney transplant, those who have already
served as a living donor will receive highest priority should their second kid-
ney fail after their donation. It should be clearly noted that a community of
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club which excludes non-members. It is a community of individuals who insist
that, in addition to the main medical criteria that dominate our current organ
allocation systems, a patient’s own willingness to donate should be included in
assigning priority of treatment. According to the solidarity model, people want
to show solidarity with all other people suffering from severe diseases, but even
more so in relation to those who themselves show solidarity.
Potential Realization
As previously stated, the solidarity model suggested here intends to establish
reciprocity as an additional factor of organ allocation to improve rather than
to substitute the current system. Therefore, the details of the model must be
adapted to the several speciﬁc system requirements in different countries. In
general, reciprocity should have a decisive inﬂuence only on priority decisions
concerning patients of the elective category to whom neither special urgency nor
other special requirements apply. Thus, patients belonging to the high urgency
category, highly immunized patients, and children should receive transplants as
a matter of priority throughout.
Under this proviso, the solidarity model could quite easily be adapted to the
special conditions, say, of Eurotransplant in the following way: Eurotransplant
allocates kidneys according to the so-called Wujciak-Opelz model. According
to this procedure which was introduced in March 1996, ﬁve factors determine
allocation decisions. Each of the factors is measured according to a different
ranking point scale. These scales have different maximum ranking points and,
thus, are of different potential importance. If an organ becomes available, for
each patient a point value along each scale is determined and then aggregated
to a total. The patient with the highest total number receives the organ. The
ﬁve factors are HLA-compatibility (maximum 400 points), 1-year probability of
a better HLA-compatibility (maximum 100 points), waiting time (maximum 200
points), national balance of organ donation (maximum 200 points), regional do-
nation rate (maximum 300 points). According to the view proposed here, the re-
gional donation rate, which is a kind of reciprocity consideration with respect to
regional transplantation centers anyway should be substituted by a reciprocity
norm concerning individuals. Along this scale, the number of ranking points
should depend on whether or not somebody is a potential donor of cadaveric or-
gans, and has served as a living donor, and on the time span between declaring
the will to donate and entering the waiting list. Evidently, the implementation
of the solidarity model as suggested here presupposes that central institution for
registering the individual donation will—either for or against—be established,
as is the case in Sweden.
Predicted Results
1. More justice and more beneﬁcence. Justice requires that those whose be-
havior increases the scarcity of organs, other things being equal, should
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solidarity rule, at least in those cases in which two patients meet standard
medical criteria for one speciﬁc organ to the same extent, the person who
has previously declared her own willingness to donate has priority over a
competitor who did not previously do so. Thus, the solidarity model avoids
the moral problem that an equally needy and suitable individual who, for
instance, opted out as a donor nevertheless gets access to the organ with
the same probability as the willing donor. Although excessive retributive
measures towards people who have severe illnesses are inappropriate, it
seems to be a clear requirement of justice to put some positive premium on
more responsible past behavior. This premium quite predictably can fur-
ther the willingness to donate and, therefore, along with increasing justice,
can enhance and broaden the scope for showing beneﬁcence towards those
who might need an organ transplant in the future.
2. Enhanced involvement of individuals and hospitals. In view of the other
institutions of our legal order, it seems desirable that organ donation and
organ allocation should, as far as possible, be based on autonomous de-
cisions of the individuals concerned. The general ethical acceptance and
acceptability of organ transplants in society will be enhanced if the num-
ber of individuals who explicitly express their consent to serve as potential
organ donors is increased. The solidarity model provides ethically accept-
able, nonmonetary incentives to endorse the transplanting of organs ex-
plicitly and, thus, enhances/increases the active solidarity of individuals
in the transplanting of organs.
The very moment a central register of intent to donate or not to donate is
in place and a higher proportion of the population has expressed its will-
ingness to donate, the status of the transplanting of organs in society and
public opinion presumably would change dramatically. Under an institu-
tional amendment as proposed here, only those who needed a transplant
and expressed their willingness to donate one of their organs (or actually
donated one) could claim to be part of the solidarity scheme. Having shown
solidarity themselves, they could then demand that no one hinder them in
receiving organs others have donated. Those hospitals that are nowadays
still very reluctant to support the donating of organs would have to partic-
ipate more actively by carrying out donations from every potential donor.
Clearly, this would increase the number of available organs and, thus, al-
leviate rationing problems.
3. Fair treatment of dissenting minorities, local residents, and nonresidents.
If organs are allocated solely on medical grounds, groups which, for ide-
ological, religious, or other reasons, resent donation, but accept donated
organs nevertheless are privileged at the expense of groups who endorse
organ donation. Discrimination against groups is completely unacceptable
in a Western legal order. In our systems, equity requires that we focus on
the individual. Accordingly, the solidarity rule discriminates against those418 Gundolf Gubernatis
individuals who want to participate but do not contribute without discrim-
inating against groups.
This also solves the problem of how to deal with individuals who travel
to another country to get on waiting lists there. If organs are allocated
according to medical criteria alone, there is no way to exclude nonresident
aliens from entering a waiting list on an equal footing with residents. As
observed in several countries, this invites rich foreigners who never would
have been potential donors for the local population to ‘ﬂy in’ and attempt to
receive an organ which has been locally donated. Certainly, such severely
ill individuals are personally not to blame for their behavior. However,
those who have to serve as guardians of the interests of local communities
are treating members of their own communities in a grossly unfair man-
ner in denying them access to organs by treating noncontributors on an
equal footing with potential contributors to the local pool of donated or-
gans. Again, the solidarity model can solve this problem to a large extent
and in an equitable manner.
Final Remarks
A small step for organ transplantation, a great step for patients. It seems obvious
that all existing schemes of organ donation and allocation must, in principle, be
open for further adaptation and improvement. Because no convincing norma-
tive reasons have been offered so far as to why only those factors included in
present practices must determine organ allocation, there is nothing that would
in principle and on a priori grounds preclude such minor and highly desirable
amendments to existing practices as those proposed here. But why has the soli-
darity model never been discussed seriously, neither in the medical professional
nor in the political or public sphere? As the solidarity model requires only small
amendments in addition to the current system, the reason for this model not
having been discussed must be a general or political one. The people not in fa-
vor of the solidarity model tried to avoid discussion by invoking the frequent
argument that the solidarity model is unconstitutional. In fact, this is not true.
Most interestingly and remarkably a former judge of the German Constitutional
Court Professor Paul Kirchhoff proposed a model very similar to the solidarity
model in his celebration lecture at the national congress of the transplant soci-
ety 2001 in Heidelberg. He proposed a reciprocity model on the basis of personal
organ donation willingness and justiﬁed his proposal by pointing out that such
a model would work within the same ethical category of the individuals strictly
avoiding categories such as the ﬁnancial one. In conclusion, this was the perfect
endorsement and justiﬁcation for Hartmut Kliemt’s and my solidarity model on
the question of its constitutionality. Nevertheless nothing happened after Paul
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Joshua Lederberg anticipated a lot of problems in the ﬁeld of organ trans-
plants when commenting on 10th December 1967 in the Washington Post on
the ﬁrst heart transplant. Most of these problems are still current. They con-
cern scarcity and rationing problems, and now, 42 years on, it is more and more
urgent to solve these problems and to deal with the consequences. The recent
Congress of the German Medical Society made it quite obvious that there is a
great need to discuss rationing in health care publicly. More and more physi-
cians are willing to take part in the public discussion including in relation to
decision-making for rationing. This should be welcomed by the public. The hid-
den shortage and the latent rationing in health care should be made subject to a
honest and public discussion by all players in this ﬁeld. However, there is still a
long way to go. Hartmut Kliemt has contributed to this aim tremendously by his
work and by providing important perspectives for the future: Hartmut Kliemt’s
work is a great step towards future developments in the health care system in
our society.